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New political trends are unfolding in Turkey. Recently 
established political parties have raised hopes for change 
in the country, impacting the political balance between 
the government and the opposition. While this is not a 
foregone conclusion, it is a development worth watching 
closely, including for the EU.
The Justice and Development Party (AKP) has dominated 
Turkish politics for over 17 years. Nevertheless, with 
mounting domestic headaches and a moribund economy, 
the AKP seems to be running out of steam. Support for 
the party is at an all-time low, while President Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan’s popularity is also in decline.
Turkish democracy is not dead and 
buried. The EU must continue to engage 
and support those that are fighting for 
democratic change.
The establishment of two new political parties by former 
AKP heavyweights, Ahmet Davutoğlu and Ali Babacan, 
in December 2019 and March 2020 respectively further 
jeopardises the AKP voter base. Even if both parties fail 
to go beyond single-digit support at this stage, they have 
the potential to shift the balance of power in Turkey. Still, 
Erdoğan has proved to be a very resilient politician and will 
push back fiercely against any effort to weaken AKP rule.
At this crucial juncture, the EU must keep its channels 
of communication with Turkey open despite the many 
difficulties in their relationship. The establishment 
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of these two parties, coupled with the success of the 
opposition in the 2019 municipal elections, shows that 
Turkish democracy is not dead and buried. The EU must 
continue to engage with and support those that are 
fighting for democratic change. 
BACKGROUND – DWINDLING AKP SUPPORT
Just at the time when Erdoğan consolidated power 
through the adoption of an executive presidential system, 
following the 2017 constitutional referendum, he lost 
the ability to rule without alliances, due to the need for 
an absolute majority to be elected. That forced the AKP, 
which until 2017 did not need political alliances, to join 
forces with Devlet Bahçeli’s Nationalist Movement Party 
(MHP) and form the People’s Alliance.
This alliance was successful in securing victory in both 
the constitutional referendum and subsequent 2018 
snap presidential and parliamentary elections. However, 
the alliance has become a double-edged sword for the 
AKP. Dependency on MHP support has pushed the AKP 
towards an increasingly nationalist line, which has 
alienated other constituencies. 
Moreover, the alliance failed to secure victory in the 
2019 municipal elections. For the first time, the AKP 
suffered crushing defeats in major cities including 
Istanbul and Ankara. This was compounded by a strategic 
miscalculation by the AKP to rerun the Istanbul election, 
which backfired. Opposition candidate, Ekrem Imamoğlu, 
won a resounding victory.
The defeat was a severe blow to the AKP and Erdoğan 
and reflected discontent over the state of the economy 
and social burden of hosting more than 3.5 million 
Syrian refugees.1 Erdoğan’s aura of invincibility took 
a hammering, which is significant in a country where 
perceptions about power and strength matter a great deal 
and shape public opinion. 
The issue is not limited to perceptions. While Turkey has 
serious problems concerning fundamental rights and the 
rule of law, these have not proven to be decisive factors 
in the AKP’s fortunes so far. However, the deepening 
economic crisis can prove to be a game-changer in 
domestic politics. Economic growth and related social 
policies have always played a central role in the AKP’s 
popularity, especially among the middle and working 
classes. Turkey’s current economic woes have had a 
profound impact on these parts of society, which is 
eroding support for the government. Several surveys 
highlight economic issues as the electorate’s top priority. 
Erdoğan has tried to push back by mobilising Turkish 
nationalism. While his and AKP’s popularity usually  
rises after pulling out the nationalist card (during e.g. 
Turkey’s offensives in Syria, drilling operations in the 
Eastern Mediterranean, the new migration crisis on the 
border with Greece), opinion polls show that they are 
temporary peaks.  
Ultimately, the AKP is no longer viewed as a solution-
oriented party. Rather, it is increasingly seen as being 
responsible for Turkey’s current woes. According to 
KONDA, a credible and independent Turkish polling 
agency, 37% of the electorate believes that the political 
parties (prior to the emergence of DEVA and FP) cannot 
solve Turkey’s problems.2  
The deepening economic crisis can prove 
to be a game-changer in domestic politics.
An alliance of opposition forces has already managed to 
leverage this popular discontent to its advantage. The close 
cooperation in the municipal elections between political 
parties with very different ideological backgrounds was a 
unique phenomenon in Turkey’s political history. However, 
this opposition alliance has limited appeal for the AKP’s 
electorate. While frustration among the AKP’s traditional 
voter base is increasing, a conservative political alternative 
that could meet their demands and expectations has been 
absent – until now, perhaps.
Discontent is not limited to AKP voters. It has also 
expanded to key party figures. Given that the AKP has 
no culture of internal opposition, this was a watershed 
moment. Several prominent politicians, including former 
Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu and former Deputy Prime 
Minister and economy czar Ali Babacan, became more 
candid about problems in Turkey and within the AKP.
Although rather timid in their criticism and not targeting 
Erdoğan directly, their opinions were not tolerated within 
the party. Consequently, some of them, including AKP 
founders, had to resign. Others were expelled. While 
many senior politicians have left the party since it came 
to power in 2002, developments since mid-2019 can 
be considered to have caused a significant split in the 
AKP, given the weight of these political figures and the 
potential consequences. 
The main question is, will the DEVA and 
FP be successful in attracting even a small 
percentage of AKP voters?
On 12 December 2019, Davutoğlu launched the Future 
Party (FP). Babacan’s Democracy and Progress Party 
(DEVA, which means remedy in Turkish) was established 
on Monday 9 March 2020. Should Babacan and/or 
Davutoğlu be successful in attracting even a small 
percentage of AKP voters, this may be a turning point 
in the country’s political balance. The main question 
is, will the DEVA and FP be successful? While the AKP 
asserts that both are headed to “the cemetery of political 
parties”, they have the potential to erode AKP support, 
nonetheless.
STATE OF PLAY – A CLOSER LOOK AT THE  
NEW PARTIES
Discontent among senior AKP members has been 
visible for some time. Recent developments, notably 
the transition from the parliamentary to a presidential 
system, deepened the divides within the party. 
Nevertheless, it was the AKP’s defeat in the municipal 
elections that encouraged some of the central figures, 
including Davutoğlu and Babacan, to act.
Since being forced to resign from the AKP in 2016, 
Davutoğlu has mainly remained in the shadows, 
not daring to challenge Erdoğan. Now he is actively 
promoting the FP and is reaching out to potential allies. 
While Davutoğlu does have a support base among 
conservative voters, he is likely to face challenges to 
broaden it given his contested political track record. 
Many in Turkey believe that he is partly responsible 
for the country’s democratic backslide since he never 
challenged Erdoğan. He was also the mastermind of 
what many views as Turkey’s cataclysmic Middle East 
policy, based on political Islam ideology and neo-
Ottoman dreams. 
In contrast, Babacan’s name is associated with the 
Turkish economy’s golden days. He was side-lined in 
2015 as Erdoğan began to surround himself with ultra-
loyal yes men. Unlike Davutoğlu, Babacan has succeeded 
in maintaining quite a positive image in Turkey and 
abroad due to his economic legacy and keeping out of the 
spotlight. Consequently, he managed to distance himself 
from measures that undermine democracy, freedoms and 
the rule of law.
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This does not mean that he is exempt from responsibility 
as a former senior AKP politician either, however. 
Babacan’s newly created DEVA has close ties with former 
President Abdullah Gül, who continues to be viewed 
favourably by parts of Turkish society. While Babacan 
regularly consulted him while establishing DEVA, Gül has 
no formal role in the party.
Cooperation between Davutoğlu and Babacan is not an 
option due to serious ideological differences, but they 
could be part of a broader coalition of opposition forces. 
While Davutoğlu seems to be building a conservative 
political party, Babacan aims to position DEVA as a 
moderate centre-right party, encompassing different 
ideological tendencies following the example of the 
Motherland Party (ANAP), which played a key role in 
the liberal transformation of Turkey in 1980s. Thus, 
Davutoğlu’s party can be considered as a neo-Islamist 
conservative party, and Babacan’s a post-Islamist  
centre-right party. However, given that this assessment 
is based on their current discourses, the actual political 
profile of these new parties will become clearer only once 
they will deliver concrete policy proposals
Programmes, composition and discourse
Davutoğlu’s current discourse and the FP’s programme 
include several interesting elements. There is a strong 
emphasis on freedoms, human rights and justice. The party 
aims to restore a parliamentary system of governance in 
Turkey. There is a commitment to the EU accession process 
and a strong role for Turkey within NATO. 
Davutoğlu’s main objective will be to 
attract disgruntled religious conservative 
AKP voters and not more moderate  
ones who remain sceptical about his 
political turnaround.
Davutoğlu summarises one of the party’s main principles 
as liberal secularism and a pluralistic understanding 
of religion. Besides former AKP members, the party’s 
founding members also include representatives from 
different ethnic and religious minorities. Someone 
unaware of Davutoglu’s past political Islam ideology and 
strong belief in neo-Ottomanism could even claim that 
this is a conservative liberal party.
While many in Turkey are sceptical about Davutoglu’s 
change in religious ideology, the proof of the pudding will 
be in the eating. Still, it is important that a former leading 
figure of the AKP and political Islam is emphasising such 
values, including secularism, as it sets him apart from the 
traditional narratives of proponents of political Islam both in 
Turkey and elsewhere. If he manages to convincingly pursue 
the party programme, this could be a new opportunity to 
revive the failed concept of ‘Muslim Democrats’, similar to 
Christian Democrat movements in the West.
That said, Davutoğlu’s main objective will be to attract 
disgruntled religious conservative AKP voters and not 
more moderate ones who remain sceptical about his 
political turnaround. Davutoğlu may also struggle to 
get support from the Kurds. He served as prime minister 
during Turkish military’s operations in mainly Kurdish 
urban centres that followed the end of the peace process 
in 2015. This has not been forgotten. 
The principles and values upheld by Babacan are very 
similar to those advocated by Davutoğlu: the rule of law, 
human rights, freedoms and democracy. The DEVA also 
supports the idea of an ‘enforced parliamentary system’, 
namely, a more democratic version of the parliamentary 
system that existed before the 2017 constitutional 
changes. However, unlike the FP, DEVA claims to be a 
mainstream centrist party. 
Babacan’s personality as a less ideological 
politician with a technocrat side plays an 
important role.
The number of women and young people among DEVA’s 
founders is quite significant when compared to the other 
political parties. The party has a quota of 35% woman 
and 20% youth. Moreover, the party programme has 
clear messages for political and economic reforms. One 
of Babacan’s key promises is to revive economic growth. 
According to Babacan, this is only possible through 
democratic reforms. In line with this, the party also 
supports expanding the rights of Kurds.
Given its positioning as a centrist party, DEVA might have 
a broader appeal than the FP. Babacan’s personality as 
a less ideological politician with a technocrat side plays 
an important role here. His success will depend on the 
party’s ability to attract both educated, young and urban 
voters who are uncomfortable with the current direction 
of the AKP and moderate, centrist voters. 
Turkey has a history of strong centre-right political parties. 
Before the AKP, parties with a conservative Islamist 
background had limited support, barring the municipal 
elections in 1990s. The AKP managed to reach out to voters 
that were not traditionally supporting Islamist parties, 
marginalising centre-right political forces. Babacan’s DEVA 
Party aims to regain the electoral territory that was lost 
to AKP and re-establish a moderate centre-right force in 
Turkish politics. This will not be an easy task, however. 
PROSPECTS – ERDOĞAN DOWN, BUT FAR 
FROM OUT
With the electorate looking for something new, the FP 
and DEVA seem to fulfil an emerging political demand in 
Turkey. Furthermore, their creation demonstrates that 
democracy in Turkey remains alive, albeit under duress. 
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This, along with the opposition’s success in the 2019 
municipal elections, has raised hopes of a return to a more 
democratic track.
While neither party is likely to reach the 
support currently enjoyed by the AKP, they 
would need far less than that to tip the 
already very fragile political balance.
While neither party is likely to reach the support currently 
enjoyed by the AKP, they would need far less than that 
to tip the already very fragile political balance. This is 
particularly significant for the presidential elections, where 
an absolute majority is required. Even with the support of 
the MHP, passing 50% of the vote is becoming increasingly 
difficult for Erdoğan, who received 52.6% in 2018. The 
presidential system provides a strong incentive for AKP 
opponents to unite. 
Experience has shown that Erdoğan is not averse to 
risk-taking, so he might call for early elections in 2021 
to try and reboot his power, given that presidential and 
parliamentary elections are not slated until 2023. Still, 
unless Erdoğan can revitalise the economy, it would be 
a huge gamble. Current polls predict that the Mayor 
of Istanbul, İmamoğlu, could stand a chance against 
Erdoğan in a future Presidential election, particularly if 
the opposition forces unite behind him as they did in the 
municipal elections. 
Erdoğan will undoubtedly try to rekindle support for the 
AKP. A shrewd leader, he becomes more cunning under 
pressure. Political pressure on competitors, limited access 
to media for the opposition, and a fierce nationalist 
narrative are part of his playbook. For example, securing 
coverage on major TV channels is difficult for parties 
opposing the AKP, as many of the former are owned by 
businessmen with close links to the ruling party. Most 
broadcasters ignored the launch of both the FP and DEVA. 
Therefore, social media platforms and new media, which 
are already increasingly popular in Turkey, will be crucial. 
Personal petty punishments are also on the cards. For 
example, in January, the management of the Foundation 
for Sciences and Arts (BSV), which was co-founded by 
Davutoglu in 1986, was taken over by the authorities.
Political trends, however, are not in Erdoğan’s favour. It 
is doubtful whether he can fix the economy as this would 
require serious political and economic reform. A new 
version of Turkey is loading and is likely to have a major 
impact on internal domestic politics. While this will take 
time, and there will be many bumps along the way, it is 
unavoidable. This evolution would carry considerable 
implications for relations with the EU, potentially making 
reform a possibility again. It is important to note that all 
opposition parties in Turkey, including DEVA and FP, have 
included explicit references to the EU accession process 
and EU norms and values in their programmes.  
Turkey remains a major strategic partner of the EU. It is 
crucial that the EU keeps its doors and communication 
channels open during Turkey’s process of change and 
work towards long-term normalisation. The EU and its 
member states should continue to engage with all of the 
political actors and support pro-democracy forces and free 
media in Turkey. This should include maintaining regular 
dialogue with the government at all levels, as well as inter-
parliamentary discussions. 
All opposition parties in Turkey, including 
DEVA and FP, have included explicit 
references to the EU accession process and 
EU norms and values in their programmes.  
The EU and Turkey face many common challenges, 
including regional security crises, not least in Syria. As 
the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, 
stated during his meeting with Erdoğan on 9 March, “it’s 
important to have a frank and open dialogue in order to 
see how it’s possible to overcome the different problems.” 
Thus, despite the current difficulties in mutual relations, 
Turkey must not be labelled – as some have – a lost cause, 
or dealt with on a transactional basis, which is increasingly 
the case. Through sustained dialogue, the EU and Turkey 
should work to improve and deepen their currently 
contentious relationship. Ongoing political developments 
in Turkey offer the EU a new opportunity to play an 
imperative role in Turkey’s democratisation process.
The support the European Policy Centre receives for its 
ongoing operations, or specifically for its publications, does 
not constitute an endorsement of their contents, which reflect 
the views of the authors only. Supporters and partners cannot 
be held responsible for any use that may be made of the 
information contained therein.
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